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DLD-041        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3180 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  ALTON D. BROWN, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-07-cv-03771) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
November 5, 2015 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 4, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Alton Brown, a Pennsylvania prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a 
writ of mandamus, requesting that we order the District Judge to recuse.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will deny the petition. 
 In September 2007, Brown filed the underlying civil action, which alleges 
unlawful exposure to second-hand smoke.  Brown has engaged in extensive litigation in 
this case, including filing a previous mandamus petition before this Court.  That petition 
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also sought recusal of the District Court judge and we denied it, describing Brown’s 
complaints as “mere dissatisfaction” with the District Court’s rulings.   
 Despite this opinion, Brown has filed another mandamus petition, again seeking 
recusal.  He claims the District Court is “attempting to force” him to respond to the 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without the benefit of the case files Brown 
has accumulated.  He also claims more generally that the District Judge has failed to 
discipline the Defendants for allegedly preventing him from adequately responding to the 
summary judgment motion.  Brown filed a renewed motion for recusal in July 2015, 
which the District Court denied.  He relies on 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 to support this 
petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 Upon review, we deny Brown’s petition.  Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.  
See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  To obtain mandamus relief, a 
petitioner must show that “(1) no other adequate means exist to attain the relief he 
desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the 
writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 
(2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Mandamus is not a 
substitute for appeal.  See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004) 
(citations omitted); Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).   
 First, to the extent that Brown seeks mandamus relief related to any refusal to 
recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 144, mandamus relief is not available because Brown may still 
take an appeal from that order after final judgment is entered in his District Court case.  
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See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 774-76 (3d Cir. 1992).  To the extent that 
Brown argues that recusal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 455 on the basis that the 
impartiality of the judge presiding over his case might reasonably be questioned, we may 
consider the issue on mandamus.  See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d at 219-20; 
Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993).  To determine 
whether the extraordinary writ should issue, we review the decision not to recuse for 
abuse of discretion.  See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 & n.12 (3d Cir. 
2004).  If a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would reasonably question 
a judge’s impartiality, that judge must recuse under § 455(a).  See id. at 302. 
 Given the facts of this case, the District Judge does not need to recuse.  Brown’s 
primary basis for recusal, his continued dissatisfaction with District Court rulings, does 
not require recusal.  Furthermore, recusal is not required on the basis of “unsupported, 
irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.”  In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 
1981).     
For these reasons, the District Judge did not err in denying Brown’s motion and 
declining to recuse from hearing Brown’s case.  Brown’s petition for a writ of mandamus 
is denied.  His motion to stay the District Court proceedings pending our decision is 
denied as moot.        
